These battalions were concentrated at Winchester during August 1915 and eventually departed for France during the first week of December 1915. It was the start of active service that was to see the Division involved in some of the fiercest fighting on the Western Front.

Mametz Wood July 1 to 7, 1916

Following the early fighting on the Somme the British Army had pressed the German Army back beyond the villages of Mametz and Fricourt and by July 5, 1916, they were facing them across the shallow valley to the south of Mametz Wood.

XV Corps was given the task of capturing Mametz Wood by the morning of July 7 at the latest.  The 38th (Welsh) Division formed part of the XV Corps and by July 5 they had moved into trenches from Bottom Wood to the edge of Caterpillar Wood, and from there they could see the task that faced them.

Mametz Wood was, and still is, the largest wood on the Somme covering an area of over 200 acres with a maximum length of about a mile.  It is situated on a low spur of the Bazentin Ridge and overlooked the valley separating the two forces in the early days of July 1916.  

Any attack made by the British forces would be, of necessity, initially downhill from their positions and then up hill to make contact with the enemy in the wood itself.  The Germans were also able to bring flanking fire to bear on any approach to the wood from Flatiron and Sabot Copses to the east.   Additionally the German second line was 300 yards beyond the northern edge of the Wood and hence it could be reinforced easily since much of the movement would go unobserved through the mass of the wood. 

To the west was the area held by the 17th Division.  To the east was the 18th Division from Caterpillar Wood eastwards.

The capture of Mametz Wood was to be the responsibility of the 38th Division though support from the 17th Division was absolutely necessary.  Facing the Welshmen was the Lehr Regiment of the Prussian Guard holding the line from Mametz Wood to Flatiron Copse.

The plan for the attack on July 7 was that the 17th Division would attack Acid Drop Copse and the left flank of the wood acting as support for the 38th Division whose task was to attack the Hammerhead.  Both divisions were to advance to the central ride and then turn north to sweep through the wood.  In the 38th Division the responsibility for the attack was to rest on the shoulders of Brigadier-General Evans and the 115th Brigade.  His reconnaissance of the ground made it clear to him that an attack on a narrow front was all that was possible and he decided that this would be no more than one battalion wide.  He chose the 16th Welsh.

The Commanding Officer of the 16th Welsh, Lieutenant Colonel F.W. Smith,  realised immediately that his right flank would be exposed to fire from the area of Flatiron Copse and he suggested that the plan be altered to allow him to attack at first light.  This was not possible because the attack had to be co-ordinated with the 17th Division. 

When the attack took place two battalions were used. The 11th South Wales Borderers attacked with its left flank as close to Caterpillar Wood as possible and the 16th Welsh were tight against their right flank.  Each battalion would have no more than a 250 yard frontage for the attack.  It was planned that the problem of flanking fire was to be eased by the use of a smoke screen.

Several things conspired against the attack.  Prior to the attack it rained and movement became very difficult in the resulting mud.  The attack was planned for 08.30 on the morning of July 7 and the 38th Division went into the attack even though the planned smoke screen did not appear.  The 11th South Wales Borderers and 16th Welsh rose to their task as soon as the artillery stopped and immediately came under fire from the German machine guns in Flatiron and Sabot Copses.  Casualties mounted and the attack died out some 250 yards short of the wood.

By 10.00 that morning the situation deteriorated as the Germans increased shell and machine gun fire across the approaches to the wood.  The 10th South Wales Borderers were ordered up in support but did not reach the battle area until after noon.  Artillery support was offered but actually fell on the men of the 16th Welsh as they tried to push home the attack.  The arrival of the 10th South Wales Borderers did help a little in the afternoon but their Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson, was killed in Caterpillar Wood as he brought his men forward. 

Gradually the attack slowed.  Evans received another order telling him that an attack was to be carried out at 5.00pm when the wood was to be entered at all costs.  Evans reported the situation to Divisional Headquarters and they in turn reported to Corps Headquarters who ordered a withdrawal to allow reorganisation.

The attack had failed for a number of reasons perhaps the most significant being: 

• The attack was parallel to and close against the German lines; 
• Lines of communication between Corps, Division and Brigade were long and increased confusion in orders; 
• Artillery control was not close enough and resulted in the loss of men in the 16th Welsh;  The lack of the planned smoke screen – apparently the day was too windy for its effectiveness; 
• No effective measure taken to nullify the effect of the machine guns;
• Hastily prepared plans.

Besides all these problems there was the added matter that the attack by the 17th Division also failed, so the co-ordinated effect also failed. 

The attack had cost 400 casualties in the three battalions engaged and nothing had been achieved.  Haig was unimpressed by the performance of the Division.  At the end of the day Lieutenant General Horne (XV Corps) informed Haig that he was not happy with the conduct of General Phillips who was removed from command on July 9, 1916.

Interlude – July 8 and 9

The 38th Divisional staff developed a plan for a further attack on July 9.  The unused Brigades, the 113th and 114th were to be used.  The 114th were to provide the main attack on the central ride, while the 113th were to capture Strip Trench.  This plan was cancelled when Phillips was replaced and nothing of significance happened on July 9 except for the command of the Division passing to Major General Watts.  An unsupported attack by the 17th Division on July 9 was completely unsuccessful.

July 10

The following day it was to be the turn of the 38th Division.  Major General Watts had taken over command of the Division during the afternoon of July 9 and immediately set about organising an attack on the wood.  The attack was essentially the same as that which had been worked out by Phillips the day before, but Watts placed importance on the equal status of the two Brigades to be engaged (113th and 114th).  The artillery plan, however, contained two novel features:

• Lifting off the main trenches to their rear as if an infantry attack was to commence – and then returning on them after a few minutes with the intention of catching the Germans as they emerged from their dugouts.  The French had successfully used this approach.
• The use of a creeping barrage to accompany the attack.

That apart, there was little subtlety to the attack which relied simply on the weight of numbers to carry the day.  It has been estimated that the Germans were outnumbered by as many as three to one and so the weight of numbers argument would seem valid.  However, these figures took no account of the fact that the Germans were fighting from prepared defences and had numerous machine guns in supporting positions about the wood.  Additionally, generally they were better trained and had more experienced men in the front line.  This was the first time the 38th Division had been used in an attack and it did not have a great deal of trench experience.

At 03.30am on July 10the artillery barrage opened up followed twenty minutes later by the planned smoke screen which drifted from Strip Trench towards the north-east.  At a little after 04.00am the 114th Brigade started to move as they were somewhat further from the wood.  This created confusion in the 113th Brigade’s area but Lieutenant Colonel Carden (16th Royal Welsh Fusiliers) sorted out this in short order and the attack was carried out with "perfect steadiness".  In the time it took to sort out the confusion the 16th Royal Welsh Fusiliers lost a measure of the cover offered by the artillery fire and subsequently the battalion lost heavily in the advance to the wood.  Amongst the casualties was Lieutenant Colonel Carden who was wounded at the start of the attack – but carried on right up to the edge of the wood where he was killed.

On the right the 13th Welsh came under fire from a machine gun placed in the Hammerhead.  They suffered heavy casualties and were beaten back on two occasions.  A third attempt was made and they managed to get a foothold in the wood.  The 14th Welsh were attacking in the centre and were to some extent covered from enfilade fire by the flanking battalions and managed to reach the wood more or less as the artillery barrage was lifting from the edge.  On the left the 14th Royal Welsh Fusiliers had suffered heavily as it attacked close behind the 16th Royal Welsh Fusiliers.  Brigadier Price-Davies committed the 15th and 13th Royal Welsh Fusiliers to the attack almost immediately so that they were then in close support to the battalions already engaged.  On the right the 10th Welsh were added to the attack making a total of seven out of eight battalions of the two brigades engaged in action.

The attack was a reasonable success with all the objectives being taken ahead of schedule.  It had not been without cost.  Casualties had mounted throughout the first hour of the attack such that in the seven battalions that went into battle five of the commanding officers had been killed or seriously wounded.  Added to this was the loss of many of the junior officers which resulted in the control of the thousands of men in the wood becoming increasingly difficult.

To the right the Germans reinforced the Hammerhead and this created havoc for a while amongst the attacking Welshmen.  To ease this situation the 15th Welsh, the eighth battalion to be committed, were sent in to the attack.  Despite the setback progress was good.  Colonel Hayes (14th Welsh) succeeded in capturing the central ride though his right was held up since there was little by way of support.  Reserves in the form of the 17th Royal Welsh Fusiliers went to support the 113th Brigade on the left, and the 10th South Wales Borderers who went to support the 114th Brigade on the right of the attack.  They arrived in the fighting at about 2.40pm and added fresh impetus to the attack such that the 10th South Wales Borderers reached a point to the north of the second cross ride and were able to get patrols out to the northern edge of the wood.

By 6.30pm that day the 17th Royal Welsh Fusiliers had reached to within 20-30 yards of the northern edge of the wood and the Hammerhead had been taken by the 10th South Wales Borderers as the German troops were forced to withdraw.  The bulk of the wood east of the central ride was in the Welshmen’s hands, though to the west it was necessary to turn a flank along the railway line facing the north-western corner of the wood.  The rest of the Division came under heavy fire from the German second line and withdrew to the cover of the wood for some 200 to 300 yards.  The day’s fighting ended there, but it left the men tired and jumpy and throughout the night there was much wild firing.

July 11

At 05.00am Brigadier Evans (115th Brigade) took over the command of all the troops in Mametz Wood.  He  established his HQ on the junction of the central ride with the first cross ride.  He brought the 16th Welsh up into the wood and the remaining companies of the 11th South Wales Borderers to replace some of the tired units of 113th and 114th Brigades.  He was expected to complete the capture of the wood with the remaining tired troops at his disposal.

An attack was planned for 3.00pm with the 16th Welsh, 17th Royal Welsh Fusiliers and 11th South Wales Borderers taking the lead.  The centre left was expected to meet with the greatest difficulties.  Evans had planned the attack without artillery support but at 2.45pm an artillery barrage was opened up.  The barrage could not be stopped and Evans’ infantry units began to suffer from the drop shorts of 18 pounders firing on the limit of their range. This bombardment carried on until 3.30pm.

As soon as the bombardment stopped the battalions moved in to action.  The 11th South Wales Borderers reached the north east corner of the wood by 5.40pm but the other two attacking units had much less luck and were held up. 

The attack was not a success though there was fierce fighting throughout the rest of the day. By 9.20pm all the troops were back in their starting positions. 

The German reaction to the attack they had halted was to realise that to continue to defend the wood was fruitless and costly.  At 8.00pm orders were issued for their withdrawal. The evacuation began as darkness fell leaving only a few patrols within the boundary of the wood.  As dawn broke on July 12 the units of the 62nd Brigade (21st Division) entered the wood to relieve the tired troops of the 38th Welsh Division.  In little time they had moved through the wood – hardly surprising as the Germans had already left the area.

The fighting for Mametz Wood was over.  It had cost the 38th (Welsh) division 4,000 casualties – about a third of the infantry strength.  The Division was relieved to a quiet part of the line because despite the effort that had been expended in the capture of the wood it was to get no credit for the work.  The Division was considered by some to have been inferior for a number of reasons and all ignored the fact that the wood had fallen to them in a relatively short time.